The Evidence-Based Investor

Tag Archive: Fama and French

  1. The legacy of Harry Markowitz: Where next for academic finance?

    Comments Off on The legacy of Harry Markowitz: Where next for academic finance?

     

     

    The death was recently announced of Professor Harry Markowitz, who won a Nobel Prize for his work on portfolio construction, and enjoyed a distinguished academic career that spanned seven decades. Latterly he was adjunct professor at the University of California San Diego Rady School of Management and he was still working when he died. His passing has sparked debate in the asset management industry about the role he played in the development of our understanding of finance and investing? So what is the legacy of Harry Markowitz? How big a contribution did he make? And what is the next frontier for academic finance?

    ROBIN POWELL has been discussing some of Markowitz’s key insights with GARRETT QUIGLEY and BERND HANKE from Global Systematic Investors. GSI, which is based in London, applies a factor-based approach to investing, combined with a tilt towards companies with higher ESG scores. It has more than £500 million of assets under management.

     

    Picture credit: UC San Diego Rady School of Management

     

    Robin Powell: There have been so many tributes paid to Harry Markowitz since his death, and they all testify to the pivotal role he played in our understanding of investing. The FT’s obituary, for example, asserted that the study of finance can be split into two eras: before and after Markowitz. Is that a fair comment?

    Garrett Quigley: Markowitz was the first to set out a mathematically rigorous way of modelling portfolios and how they relate to investors’ utility for wealth. He applied ideas from utility theory, probability and optimisation, which was a real breakthrough at the time. It laid the foundation for a new way to think about how to build portfolios and investing in general, and those key concepts still apply today, though in many different ways.

    Bernd Hanke: Yes, I do think it’s fair to say that Markowitz was pivotal. Crucially he introduced the concept of diversification to investing. Diversification allows investors to combine securities in such a way that they obtain the lowest possible risk for a given level of expected return or the highest expected return for a given level of portfolio risk. Before Markowitz, academic finance was solely about expected returns, ignoring risk and diversification. Markowitz’s discovery was the stepping stone for a host of further important developments in finance.

     

    RP: As you say, Bernd, it’s widely agreed that the chief contribution Markowitz made was to prove, mathematically, the benefits of diversification and not putting all your eggs in one basket. But there was far more to Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) than that, wasn’t there? What’s the legacy of Harry Markowitz?

    GQ: That’s right, it’s not all about diversification. Markowitz identified the key general issues that apply to any investor when thinking about investing. This involves having some expectation about returns for different investments — for example, across different stocks, or say stocks versus bonds — and then thinking about how “best” to combine them. But each person may have different views on the expected returns of each of those assets and their risk. Also, they might have different degrees of sensitivity to risk in general. His model set out how to combine all of that information into one combined analysis. This was a completely general framework that anyone could apply.

    BH: The main focus of Markowitz’s work over the years was on optimal portfolio selection. He was the first person to demonstrate that there are two components of risk, namely systematic risk that cannot be reduced through diversification and unsystematic risk specific to individual securities, which can be diversified away. Markowitz did a lot of work as well on how to build a portfolio in the most efficient and robust manner. So not only did he have invaluable insights, he also knew how to put those insights to work in practice.

     

    RP: It’s extraordinary to think that Markowitz was essentially awarded a Nobel prize for the  work contained in his PhD thesis, Portfolio Selection, which he wrote in 1952. Professor Campbell Harvey at Duke University described that thesis as “the foundational paper in finance”. William Sharpe has said that Markowitz got him thinking about what became the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which in turn was built on by Fama and French. Was Portfolio Selection foundational?

    GQ: Yes, it was foundational, because of the rigour and clarity of analysis that he brought to the field. Integrating utility theory, probability theory and optimisation was certainly a foundational innovation. Markowitz emphasised the importance of risk when thinking about portfolios and developed the initial framework for optimising how to achieve the best trade-off between the expected return of a portfolio and its risk. He also set out the key benefits of diversification in reducing the risk of a portfolio and how to model the risk and return of a portfolio based on the assets in it, and their weights. Later developments are really extensions built on those key ideas.

    BH: There’s a direct link between Portfolio Selection and William Sharpe’s CAPM. In essence the CAPM states that the systematic risk represents market risk and that all risk that is unrelated to market risk is security specific risk, or unsystematic risk, which can be diversified away. The CAPM is therefore an extension of Markowitz’s foundational work. Multi-factor models, such as the Fama-French model, that were developed later are based on the same general idea.

     

    RP: Campbell Harvey mentioned two specific examples of research he’s conducted over the years that were inspired by Harry Markowitz. Both of you have conducted academic research on your own. Has any of that been specifically informed by the work that Markowitz did? And if so, how?

    GQ: A key theme that we emphasise in our investment process is maintaining diversification. We think it’s really important not to over-concentrate portfolios. One of the critiques of Markowitz’s optimisation process is that it can in fact potentially lead to a very concentrated portfolio unless steps are taken to manage that. Also, stock returns are very noisy and unpredictable therefore its always best to maintain diversification. Our work has shown that this clearly benefits portfolios in the long run.

    BH: In everything we do at GSI, be it capturing factor premia or an ESG or sustainability tilt, we always attempt to achieve these objectives in a well-diversified manner. This allows us to exploit these desirable characteristics efficiently, without incurring undue risk. In the past, research I’ve done on risk estimation has also been heavily influenced by Harry Markowitz’s work, which often extended beyond finance and into operations research.

     

    RP: There are, though, aspects of the MPT approach that GSI, as a company, you haven’t chosen to integrate. An example of that is mean variance optimisation — in other words, trying to find the biggest reward at a given level of risk or the least risk at a given level of return. Why haven’t you gone down that route?

    BH: Our portfolio construction approach is implicitly a mean-variance optimisation. However, we don’t estimate the inputs to the mean-variance optimisation — i.e., expected returns, risks and correlations — in the traditional manner. Whenever a mean-variance optimisation is performed on a large number of securities, some of which might be highly correlated, slight misestimates of returns, risk or correlations can lead to extreme and unreasonable portfolios as well as fragile allocations over time. To guard against this, more robust proxies and heuristics often lead to better portfolios. This is the approach we have adopted.

     

    RP: GSI is a value, and deep value, investor. I had the privilege of interviewing Harry Markowitz in San Diego in 2017 and I asked him about factor investing. He told me investors should have cash and bonds and be broadly diversified across all the major types of stocks. Markowitz had his critics in the factor investing space. Do you see a tension between broad diversification and the factor-based approach?

    BH: I don’t see a tension between the two approaches. The market-weighted approach is itself a factor-based approach where the only systematic factor is assumed to be the market. Over the last few decades though, researchers such as Fama and French have found other systematic factors, in addition to the market factor. Just like the market, they are factors that affect all assets and are therefore called “systematic”. Whatever set of factors you use, it is always important to exploit those factors in a manner that is well-diversified. This ensures an efficient investment process with an optimal return-to-risk trade-off.

    GQ: Investors should be diversified regardless of the asset class they invest in — for example, large cap, small cap, value, growth and so on. There is a trade-off between maintaining diversification and tilting a portfolio further along, say, the value spectrum, especially if we want to combine that with an emphasis on stocks with higher ESG ratings. We do try to carefully manage those different objectives. In fact, at the stock level, even our deeper value strategy has a higher level of diversification than a broad market index.

     

    RP: In 1999, the financial newspaper Pensions & Investments named Harry Markowitz “man of the century”, which is quite an accolade. Of course, investing has changed a great deal over Harry’s lifetime, and arguably the biggest challenge the industry faces in this century is the need to balance financial risk and return on the one hand and environmental risk and return on the other. Does Markowitz have any relevance for ESG fund managers specifically?

    GQ: Markowitz’s framework is quite general and can in principle be applied to whatever set of objectives an investor may care about. Therefore, in our investment approach, we can integrate a tilt to ESG as well as to typical factor tilts using the same approach of maintaining diversification, managing risk, as well as managing expected trading costs.

    BH: I agree that Markowitz is relevant for all forms of investing. His theory implies that any potential portfolio tilt, such as a tilt to high-ESG stocks or to stocks with low carbon emissions, should ideally be constructed in the most diversified manner possible. This allows managers to achieve a “clean” tilt with stock-specific risk minimised or eliminated. This approach differs from impact investing which tends to build relatively concentrated portfolios that contain a small number of high-sustainability or high-ESG stocks only.

     

    RP:  In his 1996 investing classic Against the Gods, Peter L Bernstein suggested that Markowitz misunderstood risk. He used the analogy of a group of hikers that come upon a bridge that would greatly shorten their return to base. “Noting that the bridge was high, narrow and rickety,” he wrote, “they fitted themselves with ropes, harnesses and other safeguards before starting across. When they reached the other side, they found a hungry mountain lion patiently awaiting their arrival. I have a hunch that Markowitz, with his focus on volatility, would have been taken by surprise by that mountain lion.” Do you think catastrophic climate change might be that mountain lion?

    GQ: It’s up to us as investors as to what ingredients we put into these risk-return models. The models themselves are agnostic unless they are specifically designed to model climate risk or other issues related to sustainability and will generate optimised portfolios based on whatever data is input to them. Some investors may choose to ignore climate change in their portfolio, and many investors might still perceive large gains to be had from investing in companies involved in fossil fuels for example. We think it is important to include climate considerations when building portfolios, not just because of the obvious climate risks, but because innovation in renewable energies and technology will likely mean that the expected returns to fossil fuel companies could be much lower than in the past.

    BH: We can only speculate, of course, on how the future will unfold. We could see catastrophic climate change, or perhaps more widespread war and unrest, or a more lethal pandemic than Covid, or something else entirely. I suppose the nature of the risk that Peter Bernstein describes is such that we don’t know whether a catastrophic event will happen or when it will happen and we don’t even know what the catastrophic event could be.

     

    RP: As we discussed earlier, there’s a clear connection between the work of Markowitz, Sharpe, Fama and French. It’s now three decades since Fama and French published their research on the Three-Factor Model, and although they’ve added new factors to the model, we haven’t seen any truly ground-breaking developments in academic finance since then. What aspects would you like to see future Nobel laureates focus on?

    GQ: The factor research literature has led to a huge proliferation of proposed factors, as researchers such as Campbell Harvey and John Cochrane have critiqued. There is still much work to be done to simplify this so-called zoo of factors. I would also like to see economists push harder on issues related to the internalisation of environmental costs, where companies are properly charged for their use of natural resources, or for their waste. Plenty of economists are now trying to focus on this, as well as issues such as how to best structure charging systems or taxes for carbon emissions.

    BH: Given the situation the world is in now, one of the most important areas that future financial economics research should focus on is sustainability in its various shapes and forms and how sustainability can increase company value to incentivise companies to adopt sustainable business practices. If companies can see a clear path on how they could be “doing well by doing good”, they are going to be more likely to take that direction.

     

    RP: Thank you, both, for your thoughts on Harry Markowitz. And let’s remember, when considering the legacy of Harry Markowitz, he wasn’t just a hugely intelligent man; he was also a man of real integrity, who believed in doing the right thing. He loved philosophy, and his favourite philosopher was Aristotle. When I interviewed him he told me that his guiding principle in his life and work was eudaimonia — essentially being a good person and helping others. The financial industry would benefit from a greater spirit of eudaimonia today.

     

     

    PREVIOUSLY ON TEBI

    The active management delusion: an historical perspective

    Analysts and fund managers are too matey by half

    Bond fees are a good predictor of performance — Morningstar

     

    INDEPENDENT PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS

    In conjunction with our colleagues at Finominal, TEBI now provides independent portfolio analysis for institutional investors, professional clients and eligible counterparties in the UK and the US. For a fee of £950, we will provide a thorough review of your existing portfolio and identify any issues with it. We will always suggest ways to make it cheaper, simpler and more diversified. This does not constitute regulated financial advice, and we do not offer this service to retail investors. For more information and to book a free demonstration, click here.

     

    © The Evidence-Based Investor MMXXIII

     

  2. How small value stocks rebounded

    Comments Off on How small value stocks rebounded

     

     

    By LARRY SWEDROE

     

    Over the period 2017-2020, U.S. small value stocks experienced a historic drawdown relative to U.S. large growth stocks. Over this four-year period, the Fama/French U.S. Large Growth Research Index returned a cumulative 135 percent versus the cumulative return of just 14 percent for the Fama/French U.S. Small Value Research Index. (During this period the S&P 500 Index returned 81 percent.) That degree of underperformance led to the growth index outperforming as far back as 2002!

    Small value stocks began a dramatic recovery in late 2020. As an example, the Bridgeway Omni Small-Cap Value Fund (BOSVX) returned 91 percent over the one-year period ending November 5, 2021, outperforming Vanguard’s S&P 500 ETF (VOO), which returned 36 percent, by 55 percentage points. Despite that dramatic outperformance, BOSVX’s performance still trailed VOO’s over five- and 10-year periods by significant margins, 5.6 percentage points and 3.3 percentage points, respectively. With that said, it is important to note that BOSVX’s valuations relative to VOO’s indicate that U.S. small value stocks are still selling at historically cheap valuations relative to the market, and to growth stocks in particular. As Adam Zaremba and Mehmet Umutlu, authors of the 2019 study Strategies Can Be Expensive Too! The Value Spread and Asset Allocation in Global Equity Markets, demonstrated, the valuation spread provides information as to the future expected premium—the wider the spread, the larger the expected outperformance. With that in mind, using data from Morningstar, we can examine current valuations.

    At the end of the third quarter 2021, BOSVX had a P/E of 9.9 as compared to a P/E of 28.3 for VOO—a ratio of 2.9. Eight years earlier (at the end of 2013), before the expansion of the P/Es of growth stocks, BOSVX had a P/E of 11.0 versus 17.9 for VOO—a ratio of 1.6. Thus, on a relative basis, small value stocks are still trading 80 percent cheaper than they were in 2013. This is despite the fact that value company earnings are now growing faster than those of growth companies as their earnings recover from the cyclical lows caused by the pandemic. Also note that small value stocks are selling cheaper today than they were in 2013 despite the fact that interest rates are much lower.

    While the valuation spreads are not as dramatic as they are in the U.S., value stocks are selling at much lower valuations around the globe. For example, Vanguard’s FTSE Developed Markets ETF (VEA) had a P/E of 14.2, while Dimensional’s International Small-Cap Value Fund (DISVX) had a P/E of just 9.0. And Vanguard’s FTSE Emerging Markets ETF (VWO) had a P/E of 12.3, while Dimensional’s Emerging Markets Value Fund (DFEVX) had a P/E of just 7.6.

     

    Investor takeaway

    Over my more than 25 years of experience as Buckingham’s chief research officer, I’ve learned that one of the greatest mistakes investors make is that when it comes to judging the performance of risk assets, they think three years is a long time, five years a very long time, and 10 years an eternity. On the other hand, any financial economist would tell you that when it comes to risk assets, 10 years is likely nothing more than “noise.” Thus, such periods should not cause you to abandon a well-thought-out plan and make the mistake known as resulting—judging the quality of a decision by the ex-post outcome instead of by the quality of the decision-making process.

    As Warren Buffett has advised, when it comes to investing, temperament trumps intelligence. Thus, discipline and patience are the necessary ingredients for investment success. The historic drawdown in value stocks was not due to poor company performance in the form of disappointing earnings. In fact, Robert Arnott, Campbell Harvey, Vitali Kalesnik and Juhani Linnainmaa, authors of the 2019 study Reports of Value’s Death May Be Greatly Exaggerated, found that more than 100 percent of the underperformance of value that occurred since 2007 was due to it becoming considerably cheaper relative to growth. In other words, all the outperformance of growth stocks was due to the change in what John Bogle called the “speculative return”—the change in valuations.

    The evidence suggests that the period 2017-2020 was likely a repeat of the late 1990s. While no one knows what will happen from here, valuations do provide us with the best estimate. And they indicate we are likely to see a repeat of what followed when the dot-com bubble burst — the outperformance of value, from 2000 through 2007. During that period the Fama/French U.S. Small Value Research Index returned a cumulative 215 percent versus the cumulative return to the Fama/French U.S. Growth Research Index of 3 percent and the S&P 500 return of 14 percent.    

     

    Important Disclosure: For informational and educational purposes only and should not be construed as specific investment, accounting, legal or tax advice. The analysis contained in this article is based upon third party information available at the time which may become outdated or otherwise superseded at any time without notice. Third-party information is deemed to be reliable, but its accuracy and completeness cannot be guaranteed. By clicking on any of the links above, you acknowledge that they are solely for your convenience, and do not necessarily imply any affiliations, sponsorships, endorsements or representations whatsoever by us regarding third-party websites. We are not responsible for the content, availability or privacy policies of these sites, and shall not be responsible or liable for any information, opinions, advice, products or services available on or through them. The opinions expressed by featured authors are their own and may not accurately reflect those of the Buckingham Strategic Wealth®, Buckingham Strategic Partners® (collectively Buckingham Wealth Partners). Neither the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) nor any other federal or state agency have approved, determined that accuracy or adequacy of this article. LSR-21-187.

     

    LARRY SWEDROE is Chief Research Officer at Buckingham Strategic Wealth and the author of numerous books on investing.

     

     

    ALSO BY LARRY SWEDROE

    Is small-cap value dead?

     

     

    VIDEO MARKETING FOR ADVISERS

    Through our partners at Regis Media, TEBI provides a wide range of high-quality video content for financial advice and planning firms.

    For firms in the UK, we can either come to you, or you can come to Regis Media’s studios in Birmingham, where we have a full white-screen set-up with lights and autocue. For firms outside the UK, we’re happy to talk through the options with you.

    If it’s educational content you’re looking for, we have more than 200 pre-produced videos which can be tailored to include your branding, contact details and call-to-action

     

    Interested? Email Sam Willet, who will be happy to help you.

     

    © The Evidence-Based Investor MMXXI

     

  3. How can we explain momentum returns?

    Comments Off on How can we explain momentum returns?

     

    By LARRY SWEDROE

     

    Momentum, the tendency of past winner stocks to outperform past loser stocks over the next several months, is one of the most well-documented and well-researched asset pricing anomalies. In our book, Your Complete Guide to Factor-Based Investing, Andrew Berkin and I present the evidence of a premium that has been persistent across long periods of time, pervasive around the globe and across asset classes, robust to various definitions and survives transactions costs. 

    Erik Theissen and Can Yilanci contribute to the momentum literature with their January 2021 paper, Momentum? What Momentum? They began by noting: “Previous papers usually estimate risk-adjusted momentum returns by sorting stocks into a long-short portfolio based on their prior return. The portfolio is rebalanced monthly. The returns of the momentum portfolio are then regressed on a set of factors in a full-sample regression. This methodology, which we denote portfolio-level risk adjustment, implicitly assumes constant factor exposure of the momentum portfolio. However, momentum portfolios are characterised by high turnover which results in strongly time-varying factor exposure.”

    To determine if momentum’s excess returns could be explained by time-varying factor exposures (in effect, is momentum really factor momentum?), Theissen and Yilanci estimated factor sensitivities at the stock level using a rolling window approach. For each month t, they estimated the factor exposure for the stocks in the winner and the loser portfolio using data up to month t – 1. They then estimated the expected return in month t for each stock. The momentum profit in month t is then the actual return of the long-short portfolio minus the weighted average of the expected returns of the individual stocks.

    Theissen and Yilanci’s “stock-level risk adjustment” accounts for the turnover in the momentum portfolio because, in each month, the factor exposure of the momentum portfolio is based on the actual composition of the winner and loser portfolios. Their data sample included NYSE, Nasdaq and AMEX stocks covering the period 1963-2018. Each month they sorted stocks based on their prior period returns into decile portfolios. They constructed zero net investment portfolios by investing into the winner stocks (decile 10) and shorting the loser stocks (decile 1). They tested formation and holding periods of three, six, nine and 12 months, creating 16 strategies. Stocks below $3 were excluded. Following is a summary of their findings:

    • Without their risk adjustment, 15 of the 16 strategies delivered returns that were positive and significantly different from zero. Returns were also economically large, ranging from 0.18 percent to 0.85 percent per month.
    • Accounting for risk using portfolio-level risk adjustment based on the Fama-French five-factor (beta, size, value, profitability and investment) model, again, 15 of the 16 strategies delivered significant abnormal returns.
    • When implementing their stock-level risk adjustment procedure, profitability largely disappeared. The adjustment, on average, captured 94 percent of the momentum returns that remained after portfolio-level risk adjustment, and none of the 16 strategies delivered returns that were significantly different from zero.
    • There were no significant momentum returns for any size category (micro, small and large-cap stocks) when risk was adjusted at the stock level.
    • When they considered sub-periods, they found that the momentum strategy earned significant abnormal returns after stock-level risk adjustment in the first part of the sample period (1963-1979) but not thereafter. However, even during this sub-period, momentum returns were roughly 44 percent smaller if risk was adjusted at the stock level rather than at the portfolio level. And when transaction costs were considered, momentum profits became negative even for the first part of the sample period.
    • In a test of pervasiveness, in an international sample covering 20 developed countries, without risk adjustment [with portfolio-level risk-adjustment] there was a significant momentum effect (at the 5 percent level or better) in 19 [16] countries. With stock-level risk-adjustment, this number dropped to just three.
    • Stock-level risk adjustment (which captures the time variation in the market exposure of the strategy) reduces momentum profits significantly (or even eliminates them), while portfolio-level risk adjustment does not because it assumes constant factor exposures of the strategy under investigation.
    • The stock-level adjustment procedure largely explained the return of a volatility-scaled momentum strategy—the monthly stock-level adjusted mean return was 0.44 percent and was not significantly different from zero (t-statistic = 1.55).

    Their findings led Theissen and Yilanci to conclude: “In contrast to the prior literature, we find that the Fama and French (2015) 5-factor model explains the profitability of momentum strategies.” They added that while the CAPM is unable to explain momentum returns even with stock-level risk adjustment, and the Fama-French three-factor (beta, size and value) model significantly reduces but does not eliminate momentum returns, both the Fama-French and q-factor (beta, size, investment and profitability) models are able to explain momentum returns. The authors concluded: “Thus, the profitability and investment factors appear to be necessary to explain momentum returns.” They also noted that their findings are consistent with prior research, which has found time-varying factor exposures of momentum strategies.

    Theissen and Yilanci noted that their findings have important implications, as they document that the apparent profitability of momentum strategies is, to a large extent, compensation for factor exposures (or risk). These strategies may thus be delivering risk premiums rather than abnormal returns. Their findings are also consistent with those of Tarun Gupta and Bryan Kelly, authors of the 2019 paper Factor Momentum Everywhere, and those of Sina Ehsani and Juhani Linnainmaa, authors of the 2020 paper Factor Momentum and the Momentum Factor, who found that momentum in individual stock returns emanates from momentum in factor returns — a factor’s prior returns are informative about its future returns.

    That momentum is found in factors should not come as a surprise, as the research continues to find that momentum exists wherever we look: in stocks, bonds, commodities, currencies, sectors, countries and regions. For example, Christopher Geczy and Mikhail Samonov, authors of the 2015 study 215 Years of Global Multi-Asset Momentum: 1800-2014 (Equities, Sectors, Currencies, Bonds, Commodities and Stocks), examined the evidence from 47 country equity indices, 48 currencies (including the euro), 43 government bond indices, 76 commodities, 301 global sectors and 34,795 U.S. stocks and found that over this 215-year history, the momentum return was consistently significant within each asset class and across six of them (country equities, currencies, country government bonds, commodities, global sectors and U.S. stocks).

     

    The information presented herein is for educational purposes only and should not be construed as specific investment, accounting, legal, or tax advice. Certain information contained may be based on third party data which may become outdated or otherwise superseded without notice. Third party information is deemed to be reliable, but its accuracy and completeness cannot be guaranteed. By clicking on any of the links above you acknowledge that they are solely at your convenience, and do not necessarily imply any affiliations, sponsorships, endorsements or representations whatsoever by Buckingham regarding third-party websites. Buckingham is not responsible for the content, availability, or privacy policies of these sites, and shall not be responsible or liable for any information opinions, advice, products or services available through them. The opinions expressed by the featured author are their own and may not accurately reflect those of Buckingham Strategic Wealth® or Buckingham Strategic Partners® (collectively Buckingham Wealth Partners, “Buckingham”). LSR-21-46

     

    LARRY SWEDROE is Chief Research Officer at Buckingham Strategic Wealth and the author of numerous books on investing.

     

    ALSO BY LARRY SWEDROE

    SPAC or spam?

    Why do smart people do dumb things?

    Be prepared for the next black swan

    How useful are risk tolerance questionnaires?

    Endowment performance has sharply deteriorated since 2008

    How does investor sentiment affect stock and fund returns?

    PREVIOUSLY ON TEBI

    The great inflation debate

    Is value making a comeback?

    What can you do about bubbles and crashes?

    Australian investors deserve far better

    Why even Buffett has been buffeted by the index

    How to manage your cashflow properly

     

    OUR SISTER BLOGS

    If you’re a financial adviser or planner and you enjoy TEBI’s articles, why not try our sister blogs, Adviser 2.0 and Evidence-Based Advisers?

     

    © The Evidence-Based Investor MMXXI

     

     

  4. Can active managers time factor exposures?

    Comments Off on Can active managers time factor exposures?

     

    By LARRY SWEDROE

     

    One of the advantages active managers tout is that they have the opportunity to adjust factor exposures, taking advantage of regime shifts. Is that ability an advantage, or just one that is fraught with opportunity? 

    Manuel Ammann, Sebastian Fischer and Florian Weigert contribute to the literature on factor investing with their study Factor Exposure Variation and Mutual Fund Performance, published in the Fourth Quarter 2020 issue of the Financial Analysts Journal.

    Ammann et al. investigated the relationship between a mutual fund’s variation in factor exposures and its future performance. They estimated a fund’s dynamic exposures to the factors of the Carhart four-factor model — the market (MKT), size (SMB), book-to-market (HML) and momentum (UMD) factors.

    They then measured a fund’s factor exposure variation by the volatility of the factor and created a factor exposure variation indicator (FEV). Using this measure, they investigated whether performance differences exist between funds with high FEV and funds with low FEV in a large sample of U.S. equity mutual funds in the period from late 2000 to 2016. Following is a summary of their findings: 

    — Factor timing is particularly prevalent among funds with long management tenure, high turnover and high total expense ratios.

    — “Mid Cap,” “Small Cap” and “Micro Cap” funds tend to have less stable factor exposures than “Growth,” “Growth and Income” and “Income” funds.

    — FEV seems to be prevalent in different market situations and periods of economic booms and recessions.

    — Funds with volatile factor exposures underperformed funds with stable factor exposures by a statistically significant (at the 1 percent confidence level) 147 basis points per annum. 

    — Sorting funds on individual MKT, HML or UMD factor exposure variation resulted in underperformance of the most volatile funds by 102, 82 and 120 basis points per annum, respectively, with statistical significance at least at the 5 percent level.

    — The abnormal returns monotonically decreased in market, value and momentum exposure variation as well as in the overall FEV Indicator.

    — A one-standard-deviation increase in factor exposure variation reduced abnormal future returns by 71 basis points per annum.

    — Differences between high FEV and low FEV funds remained statistically and economically significant when using the Fama and French five-factor (beta, size, value, investment and profitability) model plus the momentum factor for the computation of FEV. The results were similar using other factor specifications — the Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) betting against beta factor, the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment factor, or the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor. 

    — The underperformance is neither explained by volatile factor loadings of a fund’s equity holdings nor driven by a fund’s forced trading through investor flows. 

    — The results were confirmed by various tests of robustness.  

     

    Their findings led Ammann, Fischer and Weigert to conclude: “Fund managers voluntarily attempt to time factors, but they are unsuccessful at doing so.”

    They added: “Our findings do not support the hypothesis that deviations in factor exposures are a signal of skill and we recommend that investors should carefully take our results into account before investing in funds with high FEV.”

    The bottom line is that another myth (along with timing the market in general) about active investing has been exposed.

     

    Additional Disclosure: This article is for educational and informational purposes only and should not be construed as specific investment, accounting, legal or tax advice. The analysis contained herein is based upon third party data and information and may become outdated or otherwise superseded at any time without notice.  Third-party data and information is deemed to be reliable but its accuracy and completeness cannot be guaranteed. By clicking on any of the links above, you acknowledge that they are solely for your convenience and do not necessarily imply any affiliations, sponsorships, endorsements or representations whatsoever by us regarding third-party websites. We are not responsible for the content, availability or privacy policies of these sites and shall not be responsible or liable for any information, opinions, advice, products or services available on or through them. The opinions expressed by featured authors are their own and may not accurately reflect those of Buckingham Wealth Partners, collectively Buckingham Strategic Wealth® and Buckingham Strategic Partners®. R-20-1529

     

    LARRY SWEDROE is Chief Research Officer at Buckingham Strategic Wealth and the author of numerous books on investing.

     

    ALSO BY LARRY SWEDROE

    The odds of outperforming through active management

    The implications for investors of shrinking markets

    Does investor sentiment predict market movements?

    The price of friendship

    The impact of Morningstar ratings on fund flows and returns

    How do target-date funds affect the markets?

     

    PREVIOUSLY ON TEBI

    Three reasons for active managers to feel positive

    Which is best for corporate bonds — active or passive?

    Do financial marketplaces provide enough protection?

    Who should carry the can for the Woodford blow-up?

    Woodford underlines the need for proper advice

    How to clean up your personal finances

     

    CONTENT FOR ADVICE FIRMS

    Through our partners at Regis Media, TEBI provides a wide range of content for financial advice and planning firms. The material is designed to help educate clients and to engage with prospects.  

    As well as exclusive content, we also offer pre-produced videos, eGuides and articles which explain how investing works and the valuable role that a good financial adviser can play.

    If you would like to find out more, why not visit the Regis Media website and YouTube channel? If you have any specific enquiries, email Sam Willet, who will be happy to help you.

     

    © The Evidence-Based Investor MMXXI